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Abstract
It is commonly stated that ascending price or second price auctions allocate
goods e±ciently, to those who value them most. This implies that the more
bidders at the auction stage the more e±cient the ¯nal allocation. We review this
statement when bidders have private information both on a private element and
a common element. While the ¯nal allocation need not be ex post e±cient, we
show that when bidders are ex ante symmetric, more competition at the auction
yields higher e±ciency on expectation. When bidders are ex ante asymmetric
- in particular with respect to the information on the common element - the
statement need no longer be true.
Key words: auctions, a±liated value, asymmetries, competition, e±ciency.
1 Introduction
Conventional wisdom suggests that competition is always good to promotee±ciency
in ascending price or sealed-bid second-price auctions. The best known theory due
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1to Vickrey that supports this conclusion is based on the private value paradigm in
which (there is one object for sale and) the private information held by every bidder
bears solely on his/her own valuation of the object for sale. Then ascending price or
second price auctions allocate the good e±ciently: that is, to the bidder who values
it most. Thus, the moreparticipants at theauction stage, the moree±cient the¯nal
allocation, which means that competition at the auction stage is good for e±ciency.
Remarkably, in the private value paradigm, this conclusion holds true whatever the
informational structure of the bidders, in particular, whether bidders are ex ante
symmetric or not.
Since the pioneering work of Vickrey, the auction paradigm has been extended
to cover situations in which the private information held by a bidder a®ects the
valuation of every bidder, the so-called a±liated value paradigm (see in particular
Milgrom and Weber 1982). We note that relatively little attention has been paid to
the issue of e±ciency of (standard) auctions in such a setup.1 Besides, most of the
literature on a±liated value auctions assumes that the private information held by
bidders is one-dimensional and that bidders are ex ante symmetric.2
In this paper, wewish to analyzethevalueof competition in ascending or second
price auctions when bidders may have multi-dimensional private information and
bidders may or may not be ex ante symmetric. This question is of practical impor-
tance, since it may help assess whether government agencies should systematically
favor the participation of the maximum number of bidders at the auction stage or
whether (and how) they should be more selective in the pre-quali¯cation procedure.
Ourinterest in multidimensional private information liesin thefact that, in many
applied contexts, auctions have features both of the private and of the common (or
1Some recent papers analyze the extent to which Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms can be
extended in such a setup (see Dasgupta-Maskin 1999, Jehiel-Moldovanu 1999, Ausubel 1999, Perry-
Reny 1999b).
2For the dimensionality part, exceptions include Pesendorfer-Swinkels and Jehiel-Moldovanu
1999. For the symmetry part, exceptions include Maskin-Riley (1999), Bulow-Klemperer (1998)
and Perry-Reny (1999a).
2a±liated) value paradigm. Insofarasthe private information held on theprivateand
the common element are not related in a deterministic way, the multidimensional
setup ismore appropriate. For illustrative purpose, considerthecaseof procurement
auctions. Bidders have in general private information on their own cost structure,
which is the private value element. They may also have some private information
about the general conditions of the task (like the quality of the grounds on which
the highway must be built or the shape of the demand when the task includes the
provision of services), which is the common value element. We believe that in many
situations, these various pieces of information concern very di®erent aspects of the
activity of the bidding ¯rm, and are not in general related in a speci¯c way.
Our interest in ex ante asymmetries among bidders lies in the fact that, in many
applied contexts, bidders are not all (ex ante) similar. One important such asym-
metry in procurement auctions is between incumbents and entrants. In this case,
asymmetry is likely to bear on the informational structure: Incumbents are presum-
ably better informed about the common value element.3 Other asymmetries may
concern technological aspects: Bidding ¯rms may vary with respect to their choice
of technology; For those ¯rms using the same technology (a subset of all bidders),
the cost structure is likely to share some common value element.
We consider a model that allows both for asymmetries among bidders and for
multidimensional private signals. The general setup that we consider is as follows.
There is one object for sale. Each bidder i's valuation is a®ected both by a private
element µi and a vector of common characteristics w. Bidders may be a®ected dif-
ferently by the common value characteristics (to account for potential technological
asymmetries, as explained above). Furthermore, each bidder i is assumed to know
hisprivatevalueelement µi and somesubset of characteristics(relevant to hispayo®)
of the common element w.
3We abstract here from market structure considerations, whichare clearlyalso relevant in the dis-
cussion about incumbents/entrants (these are analyzed in the context of auctions with externalities,
see Jehiel-Moldovanu 1996 and 1999).
3We analyze second price and ascending price auctions in such a setup assuming
that bidders are risk-neutral, that the information structure is common knowledge
among all bidders, and that all bidders know who is present at the auction stage. In
particular, when comparing the equilibrium outcome of the auction with or without
a given bidder, we take into account the possible change of bidding strategy of the
remaining bidders as a response to the change of information (about who is present
at the auction stage).
A preliminary insight isthefollowing. In both thesecond priceand theascending
priceauctions, aslong astheprivateinformation held by biddersismultidimensional,4
there are always realizations of signals such that the ¯nal outcome would have been
more e±cient if the winner of the auction had not participated in the auction. So
from an ex post viewpoint it is not the case that more bidders at the auction stage
necessarily results in more (ex post) e±cient ¯nal outcomes. This result holds true
whether bidders are ex ante symmetricor not. It isa consequenceof theobservation
that in all mechanisms, the ¯nal allocation must be ex post ine±cient with positive
probability whenever bidders have multidimensional signals.5
The main insights of thepaper concern the e®ect on expected e±ciency of having
one more bidder at the auction stage (that is, it concerns the e®ect of competition
at the auction stage on e±ciency). Our¯rst result concerns the symmetric case. For
a reasonably wide class of symmetric settings, weshow that in either second price or
ascending price auctions, the presenceof an extra bidder is alwaysgood fore±ciency
in expectation.
We next explore the e®ect of having one more bidder in asymmetric cases. Our
main insight is that both in second price and in ascending price auctions there are
4It is su±cient that one bidder has a two-dimensional signal and that the distribution of this
two-dimensional signal be independent from the private information of other bidders.
5In a context where bidders have more dimensions of information than there are alternatives
(like in the one object - externality free - auction analyzed in our paper), such a claim is discussed
in Maskin (1992). Such a claim turns out to be much more general, and holds even if bidders have
fewer signals than there are relevant alternatives to them (see Jehiel and Moldovanu 1999).
4situations in which expected e±ciency is lower when one morebidder participates in
the auction.6 In such contexts, more competition at the auction stage deteriorates
expected e±ciency.
Thesituationswith this property analyzed in thispaperall sharethefeaturethat
the additional bidder has some extra information that is relevant to other bidders
and that these other bidders do not have. When the additional bidder has no such
information (that isrelevant to otherbidders), weshow (forawideclass of situations)
that both in ascendingpriceand in second priceauctions, expected e±ciency ishigher
when this extra bidder participates at the auction.
The situations we identify illustrate two di®erent sources of (expected) ine±-
ciency according to whether second price or ascending price auctions areconsidered.
In thesecond priceauction situations weanalyze, thepresenceof theextrabidder
isine±cient becausetheextra biddergetstoo often theobject whiletheotherbidders
are potentially more e±cient.
The intuition for this result is as follows. The additional bidder (an incumbent)
is informed about a common element that the other bidders (who are least two) do
not know (they are entrants, say). When the incumbent bidder is not present, the
entrant bidders take the common value element to be equal to its expected value,
and the more e±cient entrant bidder gets the object. When the incumbent bidder
is in, he gets the object - even if the entrant bidders are more e±cient than him -
whenever the realization of the common element is su±ciently high. This holds true
despite the fact that entrant bidders adjust their bidding strategy to the presence
of the incumbent bidder: In order to avoid the incumbent bidder getting the object
for high realizations of the common element, the entrant bidders would have to bid
very high so that (because they are least two) they would end up paying a high price
6This result would also hold true in ¯rst price auctions. However, it is less surprising, since
even in the private value paradigm with one-dimensional private signals, one could generate such
examples (this is a standard argument against the use of ¯rst price auctions). What our paper shows
is that even second price or ascending price auctions may have this feature in a broader setup.
5even for low realizations of the common value element, thus resulting in expected
losses for entrant bidders; this cannot hold in equilibrium.
In ascending priceauctions, we identify another source of (expected) ine±ciency.
Here the mere presence of the additional bidder modi¯es the course of competition
between the remaining bidders even though (in the basic example) this additional
bidder never acquires the object. The point is that the price at which the extra
bidder drops out conveys a di®erent information to the remaining bidders (because
some of them share some information with the dropping bidder that the others do
not have), and theinduced competition between theremaining bidders isthen biased
in a way that can be detrimental to expected e±ciency, as we show.
In Section 2 we describe the model. In Section 3 we analyze the value of compe-
tition in second price and ascending price auctions. We ¯rst derive a positive result
for the symmetric case. We next explore the asymmetric case. Concluding remarks
are gathered in Section 4.
2 The model
Payo® structure: There is one object for sale. We consider n potential bidders
i 2 N =f1;:::; ng: When a bidderdoesnot get theobject, hegetsa payo®normalized
to zero.
The value of the object to bidder i is assumed to depend on a private element µi
and on a vector of K characteristics w = (w1;:::; wK) of the object for sale.7 This
value is denoted vi(µ; w).
In order to illustrate the main results of our paper, we will sometimes analyze
more speci¯c formulation of the preferences of the bidders. Here are two examples





7With some abuse of notation, K will sometimes also denote the set of all characteristics k.
6Example 2 (Additive preferences; w partially common) For each bidder i, there
exists a subset of characteristics Ki such that:




The interpretation of Example 2 may be as follows. Given the technology used
by bidder i, only a subset of characteristics Ki are relevant to his assessment of the
value of the object.
Information structure: Each bidder i knows his private element µi, and has
some private (partial) information on w. The set of variables µi;wk, i 2 N, k 2 K
aredistributed according to a joint density denoted by f(¢). This density is assumed
to be common knowledge among all bidders.
We describebidder i's information about thecommon characteristics by de¯ning
for each bidder i the set Hi ½ K of characteristics of which bidder i knows the
realization. In case Hi = ;, bidder will be said to be uninformed. In case Hi =K,
bidder i will be said to be fully informed. In all other cases, bidder i will be said to
be partially informed.
Thisinformational di®erentiation between biddersseems particularly relevant for
the distinction between incumbents and potential entrantsin a procurement auction:
Incumbent ¯rms are likely to know more of the characteristics of the object for sale
than potential entrants do.
Auction formats: The good is to be sold through an auction procedure. We will
consider two auction formats: the second pricesealed-bid auction and theascending
price auction, and we will mostly focus on equilibria that do not use dominated
strategies.8
8Equilibria in dominated strategies always exist in this type of auctions (even in the simple
private value paradigm). They are in general considered as implausible because they are poorly
robust to mistakes in the bidding behavior of other bidders.
7The second price auction is de¯ned as follows. Each bidder i simultaneously
sends a bid bi to the seller. The bidder with maximal bid, i.e. i0 =argmax
i
bi gets
the good and pays the second highest bid, i.e. max
i6=i0
bi to the seller.9
The ascending price auction is de¯ned as follows.10 The price starts at a low
level, say 0, at which each bidder is present. The price gradually increases. Each
bidder may decide to quit at every moment. When a bidder quits, this is commonly
observed by every bidder. The auction stops when there is only one bidder left. The
object is allocated to that bidder at the current price. A strategy for each bidder
speci¯es a price at which it quits as a function of current public information and
private information.11
Policy issues: We are interested in whether or not promoting the maximum par-
ticipation at the auction stage isgood for e±ciency. We distinguish ex post e±ciency
and ex ante e±ciency.
If theobject isallocated to bidderi, (ex post) thesocial valueisgiven by vi(µi;w),
which thus measures ex post e±ciency.12 For each auction format, and for any
given strategy pro¯le ¾ of the bidders, ex ante e±ciency will thus be measured by




Prfi0 = igE¾[vi(µi;w) j i0 =i]:
9If there are several bidders with maximal bids, one of them is selected at random with equal
probability to get the good, and pays that bid to the seller.
10We present here the continuous time/price version of the ascending price auction. This raises
some technical di±culties regarding the de¯nition of equilibria in undominated strategies. The
equilibria we will refer to are the limitsas " > 0 tends to 0 of the equilibria in undominated strategies
of the corresponding game in which time is discrete and after each round the price increases by the
increment ".
11In case all the remaining bidders quit at the same date, one of them is selected at random with
equal probability to get the object. He then pays the current price.
12E±ciency refers here to productive e±ciency (since we abstract from market structure
considerations).
8Although we areprimarily interested in expectede±ciency, we start with an example
that permits us to assess the e®ect of competition on ex post e±ciency.
An introductory example: To ¯x ideas, consider example 1 with two bidders
i =1; 2 and two characteristics k =1;2. Assume that H1 =f1g and H2 = f2g, that
is, bidders 1 and 2 have private information on di®erent characteristics of the object.
Given µi, w1 and w2, bidder i's valuation is
vi(µi;w) =µi +w1 +w2:






We assume that all the variables µi and wk are iid (in particular, µi and wk are
drawn from the same distribution). Bidders 1 and 2 are thus symmetric, and we
will analyze thesymmetricequilibrium (in undominated strategies) of thesealed bid
second price auction.
De¯ne the bid function:
bi(µi;wi) = µi+wi+E[wj j µj +wj = µi+wi];
or equivalently, since µj and wj are drawn from the same distribution (hence E[wj j
µj +wj =x] = x=2)
bi(µi;wi) = 3=2(µi +wi):
It is readily veri¯ed that these bid functions constitute a symmetric equilibrium of
thesealed bid second priceauction (and of theascending price auction in which these
bids should beinterpreted as theprices at which bidders drop out).13 It follows that
the object is not necessarily allocated to the most e±cient bidder (i.e. the bidder
with maximal µi). Speci¯cally, consider the event in which
µ1 ¸ µ2 ¸µ1 +w1 ¡w2:
13The two auction formats are equivalent when there are only two bidders.
9Then bidder 2 gets the object even though he is not the most e±cient bidder. As a
matterof fact, it can be shown quite generally that under theassumed informational
structure, there is no sale mechanism that allocates the good to the most e±cient
bidder (i.e. the bidder with maximal µi) with probability 1 (see Appendix).
The observation above implies that the presence of bidder 2 may actually dete-
riorate ex post e±ciency: under the event considered above, and if bidder 2 were
absent, bidder 1 would have got the object and the outcome would thus have been
more e±cient.14
Of course the presenceof bidder 2 does notealways deteriorate ex post e±ciency.
Speci¯cally, whenever
µ2 > µ1 and µ2 ¸µ1 +w1 ¡w2;
the presence of bidder 2 improves e±ciency.
Similar observations clearly carry over to the case where there are more than
two bidders and for more general distributions of signals, so that we may in general
expect both a positive and a negative e®ect on e±ciency. The rest of the paper
addresses how these e®ects aggregate in second price sealed bid auctions and in
ascending price auctions. In other words, we wish to analyze whether competition
is good or not for e±ciency from an ex ante viewpoint. Our analysis will show that
whether bidders are symmetric or not plays a key role.
3 The Symmetric Case
In this Section weassumethat all bidderssharethesamevaluation function vi, which
we will denote by v: When all bidders are informed about the same characteristics
(Hi =Hj 8i;j), both thesecond priceauction and theascending priceauction clearly
select the most e±cient bidder (the bidder with largest µi). Thus, the presence of
an additional bidder may only increase e±ciency.
14We assume that when there is only one bidder, he gets the good for free, which amounts to
having a reserve price set to 0.
10We will now analyze the more interesting case in which bidders are not informed
about the same characteristics (so that ex post ine±ciencies may arise). We now
de¯ne a relatively broad class of symmetric settings of this sort.
De¯nition 1 Assume K ¸ N. A setting is said to be symmetric if 1) All bidders
have the same valuation function v; 2) Each bidder i knows µi and wi, that is,
Hi = fig 8i; 3) The variables (µi;wi) are i.i.d. among bidders and independent from
wk, k > N: they are distributed according to g(¢) on [µ; µ] £[w; w]; 3) The valuation
function v is separable in each bidder i's information, and symmetric with respect to
the other common value charcateristics k 6=i. That is, there are functions u(µi; wi)
and Á(wk) such that:




Note that in a symmetric setting as described above, we may de¯ne
h(µi;wi) =u(µi;wi)¡Á(wi);
and bidderi is themost e±cient bidder if h(µi;wi) is largest among bidders. Thefol-
lowing Proposition establishes that both in the second price and the ascending price
auctions (and by restricting attention to symmetric equilibria), expected e±ciency
increases with the number of bidders.
Proposition 1 Consider the symmetric setting. Suppose that 1) °N(z) = z+(N ¡
1)E[Á(wk) j u(µk; wk) · z]+ E[Á(wk) j u(µk;wk) = z] is (strictly) increasing in
z, and 2) ´(z) = E[h(µi;wi) j u(µi;wi) = z] is a (strictly) increasing function
of z. Then for any m · N, the sealed bid second price auction with m bidders
and the ascending auction with m bidders each has a unique symmetric equilibrium.
Furthermore, the aggregate expected e±ciency in this equilibrium increases with the
number m of bidders.
The intuition for Proposition 1 is as follows. Consider the second price sealed
bid auction. The equilibrium bid of bidder i should aggregate the multidimensional
11private information (µi; wi) held by bidder i. The separability of v(¢;¢) ensures that
each bidder i's equilibrium behavior should be a function of u(µi;wi). Condition
1 of Proposition 1 then ensures that a symmetric equilibrium allocates the good
to argmax
i
u(µi; wi). Whenever condition 2 holds, the aggregate value u(µi;wi) is
a±liated with the e±ciency criterion as measured by h(µi; wi). More competition at
the auction stage is then good for e±ciency in expectation.
Proof. It is standard to show that under the three ¯rst conditions a) there exists
a unique symmetricequilibrium and b) equilibrium bids are strictly increasing func-
tions of u(µi; wi).15 Given this property, the object is allocated to the bidder with
highest u(µi; wi). Net of the common component
P
k2N Á(wk) , theexpected welfare
is equal to:






E[h(µi0; wi0) j i0 =argmax
i
u(µi;wi); u(µi0; wi0) = z]h(z)dz;





By symmetry, we have
E[h(µi0; wi0) j i0 =argmax
i
u(µi;wi);u(µi0; wi0) = z] = E[h(µk;wk) j u(µk; wk) =z ¸max
j6=k
u(µj; wj)];
















which is equal to °m(u(µi;w
i)) + (N ¡ m)E[Á(wk)] because the pairs (µj; w
j) are iid. Bids thus
increases with u(µi;w
i) because ° is an increasing function.
In an ascending price auction, bids are also increasing function of zi = u(µi;w
i). If n bidders
have not dropped out yet, then bidder i's bidding function is equal to (up to an additive constant),
°n(zi), which is also increasing in zi if °N is. (This follows the standard arguments developed in
Milgrom and Weber 1982).





E[h(µk; wk) j u(µk;wk) =z]h(z)dz: (2)








Since ´0(z) ¸0, and since for any z, H(z) increases with the number of bidders, we
conclude that welfare increases with the number of bidders.
4 The Asymmetric Case
Symmetry plays an important role in Proposition 1. Wenow investigate asymmetric
settings, and we analyze whether the conclusion that more bidders at the auction
stage enhances e±ciency is true.
Analyzing asymmetric settings in auctions is in general very hard because in
equilibrium bidding strategies aretheresult of a sophisticated inferenceprocess. Be-
sides, the addition of one more bidder may completely change this inference process
making the comparison very di±cult. Our relatively simple information structure
will nevertheless allow us to carry out these comparisons for three broad kinds of
informational asymmetries.
Asymmetric setting 1 : 8i 2 f1;:::;n¡1g, Hi =;; Hn =K.
Asymmetric setting 2 : K ¸2;n =3; H1 = f1g;H2 = ;; Hn = K.
Asymmetric setting 3 : 8i 2 f1;:::;n¡1g, Hi =K;Hn =;.
In all three settings, we will be interested in the e®ect of allowing bidder n
to participate. For simplicity, we will assume throughout this section that all the
variable µi; wk are independent from one another.
13The three settings di®er in several respects. The ¯rst di®erence is about the
information held by the extra bidder n. In asymmetric settings 1 and 2, the extra
bidder is fully informed of the common value element; in asymmetric setting 3, the
extra bidder is totally uninformed of the common value element. Thus, in settings
1 and 2, the extra bidder may be thought of as an incumbent while in setting 3 he
may be thought of as an entrant.
Thesecond di®erenceis about theprivateinformation held by bidders other than
the extra bidder. In setting 1, these are totally uninformed of the common element
(they may thus be thought of as entrants); in setting 3, they are fully informed of
the common element (they may thus bethought of asincumbents); in setting 2, they
are partially and asymmetrically informed of the common element (bidder 2 knows
more of the common element than bidder 1 does).
Our results are as follows. In asymmetric setting 1, we will show that the par-
ticipation of the extra bidder n may deteriorate (ex ante) e±ciency if the object is
allocated with a sealed bid second price auction. In contrast, if the object is allo-
cated with an ascending price auction, the participation of the informed bidder may
only enhance e±ciency.
In asymmetricsetting 2, we will show that thecomparison between theascending
price auction and the sealed bid second price auction may be reversed: we exhibit
conditions under which e±ciency is lower when the informed bidder participates in
the ascending price auction, but not in the sealed bid second price auction.
In asymmetricsetting 3, wewill show that theparticipation ofbiddern ispositive
in both the sealed bid second price auction, and in the ascending auction.
To conclude this short presentation, note that in asymmetric setting 3, the bid-
ding strategy of bidders i = 1;:::n ¡ 1 is una®ected by the presence of the extra
bidder n. This is because in this setting bidders i = 1;:::n¡1 have nothing to infer
from bidder n. (This is, of course, not the case in either settings 1 or 2.) Our results
thus suggest that it is the bias on equilibrium bids induced by the extra bidder that
may invalidate the positive e®ect of competition. Furthermore, our analysis of set-
14tings 1 and 2 will highlight two distinct sources of ine±ciencies that may arise due
to the presence of the extra bidder. We will come back at length to these sources of
ine±ciencies.
4.1 Adding an informed bidder to uninformed bidders
We consider asymmetric setting 1. To get some intuition, consider ¯rst the simple





and assume that there are 3 bidders: bidders 1 and 2 are uninformed of w (H1 =
H2 =;) whereasbiddern =3 is fully informed of w (H3 =K). Also assumethat the




µi > µng = 1: (3)
Consider the sealed bid second price auction. When bidder 3 is absent, the





Thus, the second price auction allocates the good e±ciently, to the bidder with
highest µi.
We now show that the presence of bidder 3 must deteriorate e±ciency. Suppose
(by contradiction) that the presenceof bidder 3 doesnot deterioratee±ciency. Then
because of (4) bidder 3 must get the object with probability 0. So assume that (in
equilibrium) bidder 3 never gets the object. Since bidders 1 and 2 choose their bids
independently, one of the two uninformed bidders, say bidder 1, must choose to
bid b1 ¸ ¹ µ3 + ¹ w with probability 1 where ¹ w is the largest realization of
P
k2K wk.
Otherwise, maxfb1; b2g would be smaller than or equal to some b < ¹ µ3 + ¹ w with
positive probability, and bidder 3 would be able to secure positive expected pro¯ts,
contradicting the premise that he does not get the object in equilibrium.
15Now observe that whenever bidder 2 wins, he must pay a price at least equal to
b1, hence at least equal to ¹ µ3 + ¹ w. However, bidder 2's expected value from winning
the object isµ2+Ew (becausebidder3 is supposed not to get the object and because
bidder 1's bid does not convey any information on w). When
µ2 +Ew ¡(¹ µ3 + ¹ w) <0; (5)
bidder 2 with privateelement µ2 will not acquiretheobject, sinceotherwisehewould
make losses. Thus bidder 1 should acquire the object. However, bidder 1 may be
less e±cient than bidder 2, since condition (5) does not imply that µ2 < µ1. To
summarize, in any event where
µ1 <µ2 and µ2 +Ew < ¹ µ3 + ¹ w;
the object would be allocated to bidder 1 even though he is not the most e±cient
bidder. Clearly, since Ew < ¹ w, this event may have positive probability even when
condition (3) holds. E±ciency is then deteriorated with positive probability.
The following proposition states more generally our result wherebidder n (only)
is assumed to know w while bidders i =1;:::n¡1 are totally uninformed about w:
Proposition 2 Assume n ¸3. Assume the uninformed bidders i = 1;:::n ¡1 have
the same valuation function (i.e. vi(¢;¢) =v(¢; ¢)), and that the distributions of their









assume that bidder n is the most e±cient bidder with probability 0, and that the
event16 fEe wv(µ; e w) < vn(µn; w)g has strictly positive probability. Then the presence
of bidder n deteriorates ex ante e±ciency when the object is allocated with a second
price auction. Besides, in any equilibrium (in undominated strategies) bidder n gets
the object with positive probability.
Proof. Forexpositional simplicity, we assume that w is one-dimensional, and we let
¹ w denote the largest realization of w. Consider ¯rst the case without the informed
16 e w denotes the random variable w; we use this notation here to avoid confusion with the real-
ization w of this random variable.
16bidder n. Then bidder i with highest value of Ewv(µi;w) gets theobject. Given that
the uninformed bidders havethe samevaluation function, this bidder is also argmax
i<n
µi who is the most e±cient uninformed bidder. Given that the informed bidder n
is the most e±cient with probability zero, we obtain that the most e±cient bidder
i =1; :::n gets the object.
Consider now the case with theinformed bidder n. Bidder n's dominant strategy
is to bid
bn(µn; w) = vn(µn; w):
Suppose (by contradiction) that the presence of bidder n does not deteriorate e±-
ciency. Then because bidder n is less e±cient than bidders i = 1;:::n ¡1, bidder
n must get the object with probability 0. Since bidders choose their bids indepen-
dently, at least one of the bidders i = 1;:::n ¡1 must choose to bid bi ¸ vn(¹ µn; ¹ w)
with probability 1 . Suppose for example that b1 >vn(¹ µn; ¹ w) with probability 1.
Now observe that wheneverbidder i <n, i 6= 1 wins, he must pay a price at least
equal to b1, hence at least equal to vn(¹ µn; ¹ w). However, bidder i's expected value
from winning the object is Ewv(µi;w) (because bidder n is supposed not to get the
object and because bidder 1's bid does not convey any information on w). When
Ew[v(µi;w)] ¡vn(¹ µn; ¹ w) < 0; (6)
bidder i with private element µi will not acquire theobject, since otherwise hewould
make losses. When this condition is met for every uninformed bidder i < n, i 6= 1
(this event has positive probability by assumption), bidder 1 should acquire the
object. However, bidder 1 may be less e±cient than bidders i < n, i 6= 1 , since
condition (6) does not imply that µi < µ1. To summarize, in any event where for all
i <n, i 6=1
µ1 <µi and Ew[v(µi;w)] <vn(¹ µn; ¹ w);
theobject would beallocated to bidder 1 even though heisnot themost e±cient bid-
der. This event has positive probability by assumption, which shows the ine±ciency
result.
17Regarding equilibria in undominated strategies, observe ¯rst that bidder n must
bid bn(µn;w) =vn(µn;w), since he has nothing relevant to infer from the other bids.
Suppose now (by contradiction) there is an equilibrium in undominated strategies in
which the informed bidder n never acquires the object. Then bidder i, i < n, with
type µi must bid bi(µi) = Ew[v(µi;w)], since the event of winning would convey no
information about the value of w. However, there are realizations of µi; µn; w such
that Ee w[v(µi; e w)] <vn(µn;w) contradicting the premisethat bidder n never acquires
the object.
4.1.1 When there is no competition among uninformed bidders
The presenceof two (or more) uninformed biddersiskey to the result of Proposition
2. If there is only one uninformed bidder (i.e. n =2), the next result shows that the
addition of the informed bidder n always improves e±ciency.
Proposition 3 Assume n =2. The presence of the extra bidder n always improves
expected e±ciency.
Proof. Let bidder 1 be the uninformed bidder with private value element µ1. Let
bidder 2 be the informed bidder with private value element µ2 and common value
element w. The joint distribution of (µ2; w) is denoted by ½(¢;¢). We now show that
for each realization of µ1, µ1 =µ¤
1, there is an expected e±ciency gain induced by the
presence of the informed bidder.17 Given a realization (µ2; w), the informed bidder
bids b2(µ2;w) =v2(µ2; w) (becausehe knows everything that is relevant to him). Let
b1 denotetheequilibrium bid of theuninformed bidder (with type µ¤
1). Theexpected






17The expectation bears over µ2, w.
18which can be rewritten as:











b2(µ2;w)]½(µ2; w)dµ2dw is the equilibrium payo® of the uninformed bidder 1 (with
private element µ¤
1). This expression is no smaller than Eµ2;w[v1(µ¤
1; w) ¡v2(µ2;w)]
because the uninformed bidder (with type µ¤
1) can always submit a very high bid
(higher than any conceivable bid of the informed bidder), thus securing an expected
payo® of Eµ2;w[v1(µ¤
1; w)¡v2(µ2; w)]. It follows that ¢ ¸0.
Coming back to Proposition 2, weconclude that it is the competition between the
uninformed bidders that is key to the deterioration of e±ciency when a less e±cient
but informed bidder is present.
4.1.2 When there are many uninformed bidders
Several results in the literature suggest that some ine±ciencies arising when there
arefew agents may disappear when thereare many agents.18 We now show that the
negative e®ect induced by the presence of the informed bidder may continue to hold
even when there are many uninformed bidders.
Proposition 4 Let n ¸ 3 bidders have the same valuation function vi(¢;¢) =v(¢;¢)
that is increasing in all arguments. Assume that the variables µi i = 1; :::;n¡1 are
identically distributed over [0; 1], and that w is distributed over [w;w] µ[0;1]. We let
µinf denote the private element of the informed bidder n, which is also distributed on
[0;1]. Let ¹ v(1) = Ew[v(1;w)]. De¯ne b¤ = [¹ v(1)v(1; ¹ w)]1=2 and ®¤ = 1 ¡[
¹ v(1)
v(1; ¹ w)]1=2.
Consider any equilibrium that is symmetric among the uninformed bidders. In such
an equilibrium, at the limit where n is very large, all n ¡1 uninformed bidders bid
18See for example, Gul and Postlewaite (1992) and in an auction context Pesendorfer and Swinkels
(1999).




Proof. Consider an equilibrium that is symmetric among the uninformed bidders.
Consider an uninformed bidder i with private element µ¤
i who makes the highest bid
(among the uninformed bidders). Let G(µ¤
i;b) denote the payo® obtained by such
a bidder when he bids b. Also let b(n¡2) the largest equilibrium bid of the (n¡2)
other uninformed bidders. The payo® G(µ¤
i;b) satis¯es19
G(µ¤
i;b) · Pr(v(µinf; w) · b)[E[v(µ¤
i;w) j v(µinf; w) · b] ¡E[b(n¡2) j b(n¡2) ·b]].
The term E[v(µ¤
i; w) j v(µinf;w) · b] is no larger than ¹ v(1) since v(:; :) is weakly
increasing in µ¤
i and w. Besides, for the maximal value of b, E[b(n¡2) j b(n¡2) ·b]] =
Eb(n¡2).
Since in equilibrium any bidder must be making non negative gains, we obtain:
Eb(n¡2) · ¹ v(1)
De¯ne b¤ = [¹ v(1)v(1; ¹ w)]1=2 and ®¤ = 1 ¡[
¹ v(1)
v(1;¹ w)]1=2. The expectation Eb(n¡2) is
bounded from below by b¤ Pr(b(n¡2) ¸b¤), implying that
Prfb(n¡2) <b¤g ¸ ®¤:
Finally, let b(n¡1) denote the largest equilibrium bid of the n¡1 uninformed bidders.
In a symmetric equilibrium,
Prfb(n¡1) <b¤g = [Prfb(n¡2) <b¤g]
n¡1
n¡2,
which implies the result at the limit where n is large.
This result implies that at the limit where the number of uninformed bidders is
very large, the addition of an informed bidder may cause an e±ciency loss. To see
19Bidder i obtains a positive payo® only when the informed bidder n bids below b. The price he
then pays is no smaller than b
(n¡2).
20this, observe that whenever v(µinf;w) >b¤, the informed bidder must get the object
with a probability no smaller than ®¤. If he had not been present, argmax
i<n
µi would
have got the object. For n very large, argmax
i<n
µi is almost surely very close to 1.
Thus when n is arbitrarily large the presence of the informed bidder deteriorates
e±ciency by (at least):
®¤E(v(1; w) ¡v(µinf; w) j v(µinf;w) >b¤)Pr(v(µinf; w) > b¤):
4.1.3 Ascending price auction
We conclude this part by observing that in an ascending price auction (instead of
a second price auction), the presence of the informed bidder would not deteriorate
e±ciency.
Proposition 5 Let bidder i = 1;:::n¡1 with valuation vi(¢; ¢) be uninformed (of w).
Let bidder n with valuation vn(¢; ¢) be informed of w. De¯ne ´i(µi; z) =E(vi(µi;w) j
vn(µn; w) =z) and assume that 0 < @
@z ´i(µi; z) <1 for all µi. If the object is allocated
with the ascending price auction, the presence of bidder n always improves expected
e±ciency.
Proof. The ascending price auction without the informed bidder n allocates the
good to the most e±cient uninformed bidder. Consider now the ascending price
auction with all bidders. Theinformed bidder n (with privateinformation µn, w) re-
mains at theauction until thepricereaches the level bn = vn(µn; w): Wenext observe
that as long as the informed bidder has not dropped out, and whatever the other
uninformed bidders have done, an uninformed bidder i (with private information µi)
remains at the auction until the price reaches the level bi where20
bi =´i(µi; bi):
This isbecausetheexpected value of theobject to bidder i conditional on theactions
of othersdependssolely on thepriceat which theinformed bidderndropsout (bidder
20The condition on ´(¢) ensures that for each µi this bi is uniquely de¯ned and increasing in µi.
21i has nothing relevant to infer from the price at which the other uninformed bidders
drop out).
Once bidder n has dropped out, bidder i (if he has not dropped out yet) drops
out at
bi =´i(µi;bn):
Under each realization µ1;:::; µn¡1; z(=vn(µn;w)), the winner of the object is either
theuninformed bidderforwhich ´i(µi; z) islargest, or theinformed bidder, depending
on whether ´i(µi; z) is larger or smaller than z.




Ew[vi(µi;w) j vn(µn;w) = z] = max
i
´i(µi;z)
Note that Ez maxi´i(µi; z) ¸ maxiEz´i(µi; z), and that Ez´i(µi; z) = Ew(vi(µi; w)).
Since maxiEw(vi(µi; w)) is the expected e±ciency associated with the auction when
bidder n is absent, we obtain the desired result: for any realization fµ1;:::; µn¡1g
expected e±ciency is larger when bidder n is present than when he is absent.
4.2 Adding an informed bidder to asymmetrically informed bidders
We now illustrate how in asymmetric setting 2, the addition of an informed bidder
may deteriorate (ex ante) e±ciency.
Weconsider a situation with threebiddersi = 1;2;3 and two characteristicsK =
f1; 2g. We make the following assumption regarding the structure of the preference
and information.
Assumption 1 Preferences: as in Example 2, with K1 =K3 =K and K2 =f2g:
Information: H1 = f1g, H2 =; and H3 =K.
The information structure thus corresponds to that of asymmetric setting 2:
Bidder 3 is fully informed of w = fw1; w2g; Bidder 2 is totally uninformed. Bidder
1 is partially informed of w; he only knows w1.









µi +w1 +w2 if i 2 f1;3g
µi +w2 if i =2
A simple interpretation of this setup is as follows: w2 represents a purely common
valuecharacteristicthat applies to all bidders while w1 representsa common charac-
teristic that applies to bidders 1 and 3 only, for example because bidder 2 is known
to use a technology di®erent from that of bidders 1 and 3.
Concerning the parameters µi and wk, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 2: All variables µi, i = 1; 2, and w1, w2 areassumed to bedrawn from
independent distributions denoted by fi(¢), i = 1;2 and gk(¢), k = 1;2, with
supports [µi; ¹ µi], i = 1; 2 and [wk;wk], k = 1;2, respectively. We assume that
µ3 = ¹ µ3 =0, µ1 ¸0, and ¹ w1 + ¹ w2 <µ2.
Notethat Assumption 2 impliesthat theinformed bidder 3 isalways less e±cient
than bidders 1 and 2. We will analyze the equilibria in undominated strategies of
the ascending price auction and obtain the following result:
Proposition 6 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the presence of bidder 3 in the ascend-
ing price auction deteriorates expected e±ciency.
Proof. Consider ¯rst the situation without the informed bidder 3. The private
information held by i = 1; 2 is irrelevant for the determination of the valuation of
bidder j 6= i, j 2 f1;2g. The auction can thus be analyzed as a private value
ascending price auction: the most e±cient bidder among i = 1; 2 gets the object.21
Since µ1 > 0 and µ3 = 0, the informed bidder 3 is always less e±cient than bidder
1, and therefore theascending price auction without the informed bidder 3 allocates
the good to the most e±cient bidder.
21The strategyfor bidder 1 (with private information µ1; w
1) is to drop out at price µ1+w
1+E(w
2)
(if bidder 2 is still present). The strategy for bidder 2 (with private information µ2) is to drop out
at price µ2 +E(w
2).
23Consider now the situation with all three bidders. It cannot allocate the good
moree±ciently than theascending priceauction without theinformed bidder3, since
in thelatter case themost e±cient allocation is obtained. Wewill prove that it does
strictly worse, thus showing that the addition of the informed bidder 3 deteriorates
expected e±ciency.
We ¯rst note that it is a (weakly) dominant strategy for bidder 3 with private
information (w1; w2) to drop out (since µ3 =0) at:
b3(w1;w2) =w1 +w2:
It is therefore optimal for bidders 1 and 2 to wait for bidder 3 to drop out, since the
value for bidders 1 and 2 is always (whatever the realizations of µi; wi) larger than
b3(w1;w2) (this is because µ1 >0 and ¹ w1 < ¹ w1 + ¹ w2 < µ2)
Let b3 denote the price at which the informed bidder 3 drops out. At that
price, there are two bidders left: bidders 1 and 2: From b3, bidder 1 (with private
information µ1, w1) can perfectly infer the value of the object to him, i.e. it is worth
µ1 +b3.22 He will thus remain in the auction until the price reaches the level:
b1(µ1; w1;b3) =µ1 +b3:
For the allocation to be e±cient bidder 2 would have to perfectly infer the value of
the object in equilibrium (since bidder 1 does). We know ckeck however that bidder
2 (with private information µ2) can only imperfectly infer the value of the object in
equilibrium. In equilibrium, she remains in the auction until the price reaches the
level:
b2 =µ2 +E[w2 j w1 +w2 =b3 and b1(µ1; w1;b3) = b2]:
Sincebidder 1'sdrop out pricedoesnot depend on w1, and sincetherandom variable
µ1;w1; w2 are independent, bidder 2 drops out at price:
b2(µ2;b3) =µ2 +E[w2 j w1 +w2 =b3];
22Note that the same conclusion would hold if bidder 1 knew µ1 only (and not w
1).
24which con¯rms that bidder 2 in equilibrium only imperfectly infers the value of w2.




and the allocation is ine±cient for example when:
µ2 +E[w2 j w1 +w2 =b3] <µ1 +w1 +w2 < µ2 +w2:
Comment 1:
Theinduced allocation need not bee±cient becausein equilibrium, theinferences
made by bidder 1 and 2 about the value of the purely common value w2 di®er.
As a result, both types of mistake may occur in equilibrium: the object may be
allocated to bidder 1 although bidder 2 is more e±cient (this occurs when bidder 2
underestimates w2); and the object may be allocated to bidder 2 although bidder 1
is more e±cient (this occurs when bidder 2 overestimates w2).
To illustrate this point, consider the case in which w1 and w2 are drawn inde-
pendently from the same distribution. Then E[w2 j w1 +w2 = b3] = b3=2, and
thus
b2(µ2;b3) =µ2 +b3=2:















and µ1 ¡µ2 <¡w1
or
µ1 ¡µ2 <¡w1 +w2
2
and µ1 ¡µ2 >¡w1





¯ as compared with thesituation in which bidder 3 is not present
at the auction.
Comment 2:
If we consider the second price auction instead of the ascending price auction,
the ¯nal allocation is ex post e±cient even when all three bidders are present at
the auction. Thus, the second price auction performs better in this case than the
ascending price auction when all three bidders are present. To see this, observe that
in a second price auction, bidders 1 and 2 would bid:
b1(µ1;w1) =µ1 +w1 +Ew2 and b2(µ2) =µ2 +Ew2;
respectively (because the condition w1 + ¹ w2 <µ2 implies that the informed bidder 3
cannot get the object in equilibrium). It follows that the ¯nal allocation is ex post
e±cient.
Comment 3:
The reason why the presence of the informed bidder deteriorates e±ciency in
Proposition 6 is somewhat di®erent from that in Proposition 2. Here, the ine±cient
informed bidder never acquires the object. However, his mere presence modi¯es the
competition between bidders 1 and 2: It does so because the information conveyed
by the strategy of the extra informed bidder is not the same for the two bidders
i =1; 2 in equilibrium.
4.3 Adding an uninformed bidder to informed bidders
The negative e®ect of competition observed in subsections 4.1 and 4.2 is due to the
fact that the bidding strategy of the uninformed or partially informed bidders is
a®ected by the presence of the extra informed bidder.
We now provide a class of situations (this is asymmetric setting 3) in which the
presence of the extra bidder does not a®ect the bidding strategies of the remaining
bidders. For this class, the addition of the extra bidder enhances e±ciency.
26Consider the following setup. The common value element w is known to bidders
i =1; :::n¡1; i.e. Hi =K. Bidder n is uninformed of w, i.e. Hn =;. The common
value element w is distributed according to g(¢). As before, each bidder i knows his
own private value element µi, which is distributed according to fi(¢). Given µi and
w, the value of the object to bidder i is vi(µi;w):
Proposition 7 The participation of bidder n always raises e±ciency in secondprice
or ascending price auctions.
Proof. Consider ¯rst the second price auction. All informed bidders bid according
to bi(µi; w) =vi(µi; w), and theirbidding strategy is not a®ected by theparticipation
of another bidder. Let v =maxi·n¡1 vi(µi;w), and let f denote the distribution over
v. When the entrant bidder bids bn+1 and makes the highest bid, the second highest
bid is equal to v, hence his gain is equal to vn(µn;w) ¡v. Thus his expected gain





For each realization µn, the expected gain of the uninformed bidder thus coincides
with the expected e±ciency change due to the presence of bidder n (note that the
presence of bidder n does not change the allocation between the informed when in
the event where biddern doesnot get theobject). Since, in equilibrium, thebidding
strategy bn(µn) of the uninformed bidder satis¯es
G(µn;bn(µn)) ¸ 0;
the participation of bidder n may only enhance e±ciency.
The analysis of ascending price auction is similar. Instead of looking at each
realization µn, we consider the random variables µn; v1; :::vn¡1 and i0 where vi =
vi(µi; w); for i = 1; :::;n ¡1 and i0 =argmax
i<n
vi, and we consider the realizations
fµn; fvigi6=i0g. For each such realization, if bidder n modi¯es the ¯nal allocation,
expected e±ciency must increase (by the same argument as above).
275 Conclusion
This paperhasshown that when biddershavemultidimensional signals(on a private,
a common and possibly a partially common element), the addition of one bidder at
the auction stage may deteriorate expected e±ciency in asymmetric cases in either
the second price or the ascending price auction. One should thus be cautious when
recommending tosystematically promotethemaximumparticipation in procurement
like auctions.23
Speci¯cally, our analysis suggests that the addition of a bidder who does not
have (much) information a®ecting the valuations of others is likely to be good for
e±ciency. Thus, our analysis gives little ground to restricting the access to auctions
of entrant bidders.
Restricting the access of bidders who have some information (relevant to other
bidders) may be justi¯able in somecases, as our paper shows. A systematic analysis
of access restriction deserves further research.
Appendix






we assume that the private information (µi; wi) held by bidder i is independently
distributed from that of any other bidder j, j 6= i (in particular, Hi \ Hj = ;
8i;j 6=i). Besides, for all i there exist draws of (µj; wj)j2N such that bidder i is the
most e±cient bidder. We have:
23Another important reason for whymore competition (or more participation) at the auction stage
may not enhance e±ciency is that of market structure considerations (because then the valuation
may include preemption or predatory arguments and give rise to war of attrition phenomena, see
Jehiel and Moldovanu 1996).
28Proposition 8 There exists no sale mechanism and thus no auction format that
allows to allocate the good to the ex post e±cient bidder with probability 1.
The technique of proof and argument is analog to that in Jehiel, Moldovanu and
Stacchetti (1996) (see also Jehiel and Moldovanu (1998) and Dasgupta and Maskin
(1998)).
Proof. By the revelation principle there is no loss of generality in restricting atten-
tion to direct incentive mechanisms. Such a mechanism is de¯ned by the functions
pi(¢);yi(¢) from S = Si £S¡i ! < where 1) Si = [µi;µi] ££k2Hi[wk; wk] is the
type space of each bidder, 2) pi(si; s¡i) is the probability that the good is allocated
to i when the reports of i and all other bidders ¡i are si and s¡i, respectively and











as the expected payment made by i and expected probability that i gets the good
respectively when i reports type ti.
The expected utility that i gets when his signal is si and he reports ti while

















Let Vi(si) =Ui(ti; si). If bidder i with type si prefers announcing ti = si (incentive























Thus, to satisfy the incentive constraints, it should be that qi(si) is a sole function
of zi = µi+wi.
Consider the rule that allocates the good to the most e±cient bidder with prob-
ability 1. That rule leads to q
eff







where Fj(¢) denoted the cumulative distribution of fj(¢). That function clearly de-
pends on wi and therefore is not implementable whatever the mechanism to be
considered.
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